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INTRODUCTION
As the companion to this Article explains,1 controversy persists
over exactly why the Fourteenth Amendment—the federal
Constitution’s most important provision—was legitimately adopted.
Congress excluded representatives from the defeated South when it
proposed the Amendment in 1866 (thereby allowing the two-thirds
proposal votes in each house) and kept them out until Southern states
ratified it in 1868 (thereby allowing a three-fourths ratification vote
among states). Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, John Harrison, and
Thomas Colby offer four different theories to justify the Amendment.2
Ackerman finds such legitimacy in national politics and a new, nonArticle V ability to coerce state ratifications.3 Harrison finds a
somewhat diluted form of legitimacy—“lawfulness”—in the formal
lack of prohibition on such coercion, despite the fact that Article V4 was
designed to prevent amendments without genuine three-fourths
support among the states.5 Amar roots the amendment’s legitimacy in

1. Christopher R. Green, The South Tried to Secede, and You’ll Never Guess What
Happened
Next:
Loyal
Denominatorism
and
the
Fourteenth
Amendment,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317471 [hereinafter STS].
2. Id. at 16–17, nn.23–26 and accompanying text.
3. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 233–49 (1998).
4. U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . . which . . . shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of threefourths of the several States . . . .”).
5. John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
375, 457–58 (2001) (asserting that the purpose of Article V was to prevent constitutional change
opposed by a sectional coalition in control of more than one-fourth of the states). Lawrence Tribe
distinguished “lawfulness” from “legitimacy” in a tweet following John Lewis’s attack on
President Trump’s legitimacy. Laurence Tribe (@tribelaw), TWITTER (Jan. 16, 2017, 3:40 AM),
https://goo.gl/1F5QWi (“I revere John Lewis but think it might’ve helped for him to distinguish
‘legitimate’ from ‘lawful[.]’ A lawful POTUS can still be illegitimate.”).
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use of Article IV6 to support a federal demand for black suffrage.7
Colby roots the Amendment’s legitimacy in its morally-justified use (as
Colby sees it) by later generations.8
Rather than nationalizing, democratizing, formalizing, or
intergenerationalizing the constitutional author of the Fourteenth
Amendment, this Article and its companion defend still a fifth tack:
excluding rebel States from the Article V denominator. We the People
who enacted the Fourteenth Amendment were We the Reliably Loyal
People, exercising their jus post bellum rights prior to re-establishing
legal peace. The Fourteenth Amendment became law on February 12,
1867, when 20 of the 26 states exercising federal political power had
ratified it, rather than in July 1868, when 28 of the full 37 states in the
Union had done so. The Thirteenth Amendment on this view also gets
a bit older, becoming law in June rather than December 1865.
Loyal denominatorism reads “the several States” in Article V—and
kindred phrases in Articles I, II, and IV—to have a tacit limit to reliably
loyal States with whom the federal government is legally in a state of
peace. This sort of tacit limit is not an exotic, idiosyncratic theory fitting
only the fevered minds of the likes of Charles Sumner and Thaddeus
Stevens. The companion Article shows that this theory was articulated,
and in compelling detail, by many other Republicans during
Reconstruction—and was assumed even by then-Senator Andrew
Johnson in 1861—continuing through 1868, when many Republicans
said the Fourteenth Amendment was already law even before Southern
ratifications.9 Many commentators, like Joel Prentiss Bishop, John
Codman Hurd, and J.W. Burgess, adopted this view.10
Moreover, they were right. This Article shows how a loyal
denominator follows from: (1) commonplace ancient, medieval, and

6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
7. Akhil Amar, Lindsey Ohlsson Worth, & Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Reconstructing the
Republic: The Great Transition of the 1860s, in TRANSITIONS 114 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012); see also
Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—And Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F.
109, 112 (2013) (“At a certain point, states with abysmal track records could be deemed
unrepublican within the meaning of Article IV . . . .”).
8. Thomas Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. 1627, 1681 (2013) (preferring “our own evolving understanding of the lofty freedoms
that are guaranteed by the abstract terms of the Fourteenth Amendment” to the “outdated, and
even-at-the-time highly controversial, nineteenth-century notions of liberty and equality that
were held by the prevailing Unionists”).
9. STS, supra note 1, at 23 n.38 and accompanying text.
10. Id. at 60 n.222, 61 n.226, and 61 n.228 and accompanying text.
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contemporary insights into tacit limits in language; (2) universallyrecognized canons on agreements’ tacit limits during armed conflict;
(3) similarly uncontroversial jus post bellum rules governing the timing
of the re-establishment of peace in the eyes of the law; and (4)
congressional power to delay such re-establishment under its declarewar power. None of these steps requires us to venture beyond wellestablished, secure territory. Indeed, denying a loyal denominator
requires resisting a nearly universal consensus of informed observers
on at least one of these four points.
Section I of this Article explains the linguistic background to how
we might read “the several States” in Article V as, in context, tacitly
meaning “the several [reliably loyal] States”; this rebuts Harrison’s
hyper-textualist and formalist arguments to the contrary and shows
why he himself, in inferring a tacit relationship between Article VI and
other constitutional powers, uses such linguistic moves. Section II
considers the specific canon of interpretation under the law of armed
conflict that friendship-presupposing agreements are tacitly suspended
when war breaks out between their parties. Section III considers how
long such wartime suspension lasts: as long as the victor deems it
necessary to achieve sufficient security for its victory. Section IV
considers where such peacetime-delaying power lies in the American
scheme: clearly Congress, which has the power to declare that a state of
war (still) exists, and which, in the context of Reconstruction, declared
in July 1866 that all “political relations” were suspended until Congress
acted, and in March 1867 declared that former Confederate states
besides Tennessee were even then still “rebel States.”
Section V explains four implications of this view of Fourteenth
Amendment legitimacy. First, by narrowing the scope of the Article V
actor, we eliminate coercion from the process of constitutional
adoption and see its adoption as the product of “reflection and choice”
by the loyal North. Second, moving up the date of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s adoption requires us to reclassify Reconstruction Act
coercion of the South as part of the Amendment’s enforcement, rather
than its adoption. This move properly frames Southern intransigence in
response to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as a jus post
bellum problem, shows the folly of the fiction that all states in the
Union stand as equal sovereigns, and illuminates how the Constitution
presents itself on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Third, this Article’s
argument shows why context-sensitive tacit restrictions are important
in assessing the Constitution’s original meaning. Fourth, a Northern
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author affects the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning in cases like
Brown v. Board of Education,11 McDonald v. Chicago,12 and for the
history of substantive due process.
I. TACIT DOMAIN RESTRICTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, AND
LAW
John Harrison, one of the few contemporary thinkers to explicitly
consider and reject a loyal Article V denominator, bases his argument
on the text: “Article V, however, is pretty clear about this: three-fourths
of the states. If South Carolina was still a state, it counted.”13 At first
glance, this argument may seem compelling, at least to a textualist (like
me14). But the text only expresses meaning in a context, and that
context supplies implicit domain limitations.
A. Philosophy
Tacit restrictions on quantifier domain are a well-worn part of
modern linguistics and philosophy of language. As Larry Solum noted
in one of his classic parodies, using current philosophy of language and
linguistics to interpret an eighteenth-century text is akin to using
modern chemistry to understand an eighteenth-century explosion.15
Modern philosophers and linguists regularly avert to “tacit quantifier
domain restriction” to explain various bits of linguistic data. Daniel
Korman uses a well-worn example:
If I were to open the fridge in search of beer and say ‘there is no
beer,’ what you would probably understand me to be saying is that
there is no beer in the fridge. In other words, you would take me to
be tacitly restricting the domain of my quantifier to things in the
fridge.16

11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
13. Harrison, supra note 5, at 421.
14. See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis
for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607 (2009).
15. Larry Solum, Rakove on the Historical Case for Original Ideas Originalism, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG, (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:31 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2016/04/rakoveon-the-historical-case-for-original-ideas-originalism.html (“Using Grice’s theory of meaning to
understand an eighteenth century text is no more sensible than using twentieth century chemistry
to understand an eighteenth century explosion.”).
16. DANIEL Z. KORMAN, OBJECTS: NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY 42 (2015). The beerin-the-fridge example goes back at least to DAVID K. LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS
136 (1986) (“[W]hen I say such things, I am restricting my quantifers, just as when I look in the
fridge and say that there is no beer. I do not deny that there is beer outside the fridge, but I ignore
it in my speech.”).
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Kai von Fintel notes that “all quantifiers have a hidden domain
argument, whose value is contextually supplied.”17 Tacit, contextuallysupplied restrictions on interpreting quantifiers in natural language is
not—like, say, the analytic-synthetic distinction18—an issue on which
philosophers disagree; contemporary philosophers and linguists take it
as an uncontroversial datum to be explained.
B. History
While the most sophisticated tools available should be used to
understand how language operates and had operated in the past, the
same basic idea was well known as long ago as Aristotle. The
Nicomachean Ethics defend equitable interpretation to correct the
“error through speaking without qualification” (sometimes translated
“oversimplicity”) of the outward form of language,19 while the Rhetoric
likewise argues that because “no exact definition is possible, but
legislation is necessary,” and because of the “infinite number of cases,”
we must interpret legislators’ work equitably.20 Aristotle’s example was
a penalty enhancement for striking a victim with an iron; an assailant
who happened to wear an iron ring might fall under a hyper-literal
reading of the enhancement, but the enhancement should be
interpreted to apply only to those who strike others with an iron when

17. Kai von Fintel, Restrictions on Quantifier Domains 28 (May 1994) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Massachusetts) (on file with the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law
& Public Policy); cf. Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson, Quantifiers and Context-Dependence,
55 ANALYSIS 291, 291 (1995) (“As is familiar, the truth of an utterance of a sentence containing
a quantified expression must be evaluated with respect to a contextually determined domain.”);
Jason Stanley & Zoltan Szabo, On Quantifier Domain Restriction, 15 MIND & LANGUAGE 219,
219 (2000) (“The topic of this paper is the problem of quantifier domain restriction, which is a
special case of the problem of context dependence.”); LEWIS, supra note 16, at 164 (“[P]art of the
ordinary meaning of any idiom of quantification consists in the susceptibility to restrictions; and
that restrictions come and go with the pragmatic wind.”); FRANCOIS RECANTI, LITERAL
MEANING 87 (2004) (disagreeing with Stanley and Szabo’s treatment of tacit quantifier domain
restriction, but treating the phenomenon itself as utterly uncontroversial); id. at 104 n.11 (noting
history of idea in modern linguistics).
18. See THE PHILPAPERS SURVEYS, https://goo.gl/LPaEUK (last visited Oct. 6, 2017)
(finding, in a November 2009 survey, that 64.9% of philosophers say “yes” or “lean toward”
saying “yes” to analytic-synthetic distinction, 27.1% “no” or “lean no”).
19. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 5.10.5 175 (F. H. Peters trans., 5th ed. 1893).
20. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1.13.13-14 147 (Freese trans., 1947) (“[B]eing unable to define
for all cases, [legislators] are obliged to make a universal statement, which is not applicable to all,
but only to most, cases; and whenever it is difficult to give a definition owing to the infinite number
of cases, as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron instrument used in wounding; for life would
not be long enough to reckon all the possibilities. If then no exact definition is possible, one must
have recourse to general terms.”).
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the iron makes the assault more serious.21 This domain restriction is
tacit.
English law’s use of the same idea was discussed extensively by
multiple authors. Discussing tacit insanity or infancy defenses and
relying on Aristotle, Edmund Plowden noted in 1574 that “this
correction of the general words is much used in the law of England.”22
Coke’s Institutes noted in 1639 that equitable interpretation was
required because “the Law-maker could not possibly set downe all
cases in expresse termes.”23 Isaac Watts noted in a 1724 textbook that
quantifiers like “all, every, whatsoever” are, depending on the context,
“used in a more extensive, or more limited sense.”24 Emer de Vattel in
1758 noted that there are “exceptions so clear, that it is unnecessary to
express them.”25 Blackstone in 1768 noted that tacit equitable
exceptions were required because “all cases cannot be foreseen; or, if
foreseen, cannot be expressed.”26 Also following Aristotle, James
Wilson noted in 1790 that equitable interpretation was required
because it was “impossible to specify or to foresee every case.”27
C. Law
Moreover, recognizing tacit restrictions on the domains of
constitutional and statutory language has always been commonplace at
the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. Maryland’s discussion of “necessary”
notes the importance of context in explaining precisely what
constitutional language expresses. Marshall explained:
21. See id. (“[I]f a man wearing a ring lifts up his hand to strike or actually strikes, according
to the written law he is guilty of wrongdoing, but in reality he is not; and this is a case for equity.”).
22. Eyston v. Studd, 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 696 (1574) (U.K.).
23. 2 EDWARD COKE, Institutes of the Lawes of England, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 573, 682 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (1639).
24. ISAAC WATTS, LOGIC: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON IN THE INQUIRY AFTER
TRUTH 60 (1792) (1724). Watts discusses quantifiers as part of an extended explanation of the
ways in which words can be “equivocal,” a discussion similar to Madison’s discussion of language
in the Federalist Papers. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST 183 (Carey &
McClellan eds. 2001) (No. 37, James Madison) (“All new laws, though penned with the greatest
technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or
less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of
particular discussions and adjudications.”). The second item in Madison’s papers is a series of
notes on Watts’s textbook, likely prepared at Princeton. See 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
32–42 (Hutchinson & Rachal eds., 1962), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/0101-02-0003.
25. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 427 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore
eds., 2008) (1758) (citing Seneca the rhetorician).
26. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430.
27. 2 JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 924
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., Liberty Fund 2007) (1790) (part 2, chapter 3).
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Almost all compositions contain words, which, taken in their
rigorous sense, would convey a meaning different from that which is
obviously intended. It is essential to just construction, that many
words which import something excessive, should be understood in a
more mitigated sense—in that sense which common usage justifies.
. . . A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or
indispensably necessary. To no mind would the same idea be
conveyed by these several phrases.28

In 1919 and 1920, the Supreme Court endorsed tacit restriction to
the Article V denominator—albeit at the proposal stage, rather than at
ratification—in two cases concerning veto overrides29 and the
Eighteenth Amendment.30 The Court held that only two thirds of those
voting, not two thirds of the entire membership of the houses of
Congress, was required to propose an amendment. This precise
denominator was not set out in the text of Article V, but only implicit
from context. Only those participating in the amendment-proposal
process counted in setting the proposal denominator. An analogous
principle would similarly limit the ratification denominator to those
states participating in federal political power.
The commonplace nature of tacit limits to language was clear in
1994. Echoing Plowden’s 1574 discussion of implicit mens rea
requirements, the Court inferred a knowledge requirement for the
criminalization of machine-gun possession, despite “[s]ilence” in the
statute.31 The concurrence and dissent quarreled only with whether an
implicit exception was warranted in the case, not with the general
principle of tacit contextual limits.32
A tacit loyalty requirement for Article I, Article II, or Article V
power can be seen as a tacit “good mind” restriction analogous to the
“bad mind” inferences of the criminal law. Insane people are not
subject to the facially-exceptionless words of the criminal law, and
rebellious States likewise cannot partake of facially-exceptionless
federal political power in the Constitution.
28. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 414 (1819).
29. Mo. Pac. Railway v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276, 281–84 (1919) (discussing history of limited
Article V proposal denominator beginning from the Bill of Rights).
30. Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (briefly following Missouri Pacific).
31. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994); cf. Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 252 (1952) (inferring mens rea “even if their enactments were silent on the subject”).
32. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that government conceded
existence of implicit mens rea requirement, quarreling only with its precise content); id. at 626
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he lack of an express knowledge requirement . . . is not
dispositive . . . .”).
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D. Tacit Domain Restrictions During the Civil War and
Reconstruction
While Harrison finds clarity in the simple, unqualified word
“states” in Article V, everyone during Reconstruction acknowledged
the existence of some tacit conditions on states’ powers under the
Constitution. The most radical theory denied even President Johnson’s
ability to impose additional conditions, but taking the Article VI oath
was seen as a bare minimum.33 Indeed, Harrison himself interprets
Article VI as tacitly limiting Article I powers:
Article VI indicates that a state government, in order to qualify as
such, must through its law recognize the supremacy of federal law.
[Harrison here simply footnotes Article VI itself.] Its officers must
in general be bound by the Article VI oath. Hence whatever else
they were, the organizations that sent senators to Richmond were
not governments of United States. Article VI imposes a necessary
condition for loyalty: a state government must represent itself as
such in its law.34

This is not actually what Article VI says—not explicitly. The Article
VI oath nowhere establishes itself explicitly as a condition precedent
to Article I powers; officials are simply required to take the oath, and
are not subject to any particular penalty if they do not.35 Harrison
resists adding any further conditions like loyalty to the exercise of
Article I powers beyond the Article VI oath, because “the Constitution
does not indicate this explicitly.”36 But neither does it indicate a
condition-precedent relationship between Article VI and Article I
explicitly. The Office of Legal Counsel noted properly in 1985—an
opinion to which President Obama’s advisors apparently looked when
considering whether to re-do his oath following its garbling at his first
inauguration37—that “the taking of the oath is not, strictly speaking, a
prerequisite to assumption of the powers and duties of the
33. See WILLIAM A. DUNNING, ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION AND
RELATED TOPICS 102 (1897) (“[I]t became the duty of the officers to take the oath required by
the constitution, of the legislature to provide for the dispatch of congressmen to Washington, and
of the people of the state to submit to the authority of the courts and officials of the national
government. These steps having being taken, the Union would stand under the constitution as
before the war.”).
34. Harrison, supra note 5, at 431.
35. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned,
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution . . . .”).
36. Harrison, supra note 5, at 432.
37. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH 4, 1–15 (2012).
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Presidency.”38 Resolving when statutory or constitutional provisions
tacitly establish conditions precedent to other provisions is sometimes
quite difficult.39 It is a mistake to pretend that these relationships
between provisions are actually explicit simply because the first
provision is set out in the text.
Similarly, even if Southern governments were not republican in
form under Article IV,40 jumping to those governments’ lack of Article
I powers would also require tacit conditions in Article I. The question
is not whether there are tacit conditions at all, but what those tacit
conditions are.
E. Is a Tacit Loyalty Requirement Too Vague?
Harrison is right that “the concept of loyalty [is] both vague and
difficult to implement.”41 But sometimes the Constitution is vague and
difficult to implement. On this issue too, Aristotle had it right:
We must be content if we can attain to so much precision in our
statement as the subject before us admits of . . . . [W]e must be
content if we can indicate the truth roughly and in outline . . . . [I]t
is the mark of an educated man to require, in each kind of inquiry,
just so much exactness as the subject admits of: it is equally absurd to
accept probable reasoning from a mathematician, and to demand
scientific proof from an orator.42

Macaulay’s answer to the doctrine of absolute non-resistance to the
king, which he analogizes to self-defense, eloquently strikes a similar
theme:
A good action is not distinguished from a bad action by marks so
plain as those which distinguish a hexagon from a square. There is a

38. Operation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, 9 Op.
O.L.C. 65, 67 (1985).
39. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436,
442 (2016) (explaining that while the seal requirement for False Claim Act relators is mandatory,
its breach does not necessarily mean that the case must be dismissed; “[a]lthough the duty is
mandatory, the sanction for breach is not loss of all later powers to act”) (quoting United States
v. Montalvo–Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 718 (1990)); In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401, 403 (Miss. 2012)
(breach of publication requirement does not invalidate subsequent pardon, even though that
requirement is mandatory).
40. See, e.g., Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—And Thus of Section 5, supra note 7, at
112 (“At a certain point, states with abysmal track records could be deemed unrepublican within
the meaning of Article IV . . . .”).
41. Harrison, supra note 5, at 432; see also id. at 421 (explaining that a loyal denominator
would “introduc[e] another layer of uncertainty into Article V, which performs its function better
the clearer it is”).
42. ARISTOTLE, supra note 19, at 3–4 (section 1.3) (emphasis added).
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frontier where virtue and vice fade into each other . . . . All our jurists
hold that a certain quantity of risk to life or limb justifies a man in
shooting or stabbing an assailant: but they have long given up in
despair the attempt to describe, in precise words, that quantity of
risk . . . . A man beset by assassins is not bound to let himself be
tortured and butchered without using his weapons, because nobody
has ever been able precisely to define the amount of danger which
justifies homicide. Nor is a society bound to endure passively all that
tyranny can inflict, because nobody has ever been able precisely to
define the amount of misgovernment which justifies rebellion.43

Harrison’s demand for precision in Article V at the cost of
abandoning the power of constitutional amendment during the war
contrasts sharply with his toleration of some vagueness in other
Fourteenth Amendment contexts. He correctly reads the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as a general ban on second-class citizenship,44 a
concept whose boundaries will undoubtedly be fuzzy.45 Harrison noted
famously in defense of that fuzziness, “I do not suggest that there are
easy answers to the questions thus formulated, but they have the virtue
of being the Constitution’s questions rather than our own.”46 This is
exactly right; if, in context, some of the Constitution’s provisions have
vague tacit limits on their domains, our desire for a precise Constitution
will be unsatisfied.
II. “STATES” AS TACITLY LIMITED TO “LOYAL STATES”
Harrison’s concern about the vagueness of a tacit limit on
constitutional powers is, however, a real one: equitable interpretation
can seem to open the door to freewheeling textual revision and a simple
refusal to obey controlling authority. Even while they argued that tacit
domain restrictions were inevitable, Vattel in 1758 noted the need to be

43. 2 THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION
II 305 (chapter 9) (Harper & Brothers ed., 1850) (hyphenation and emphasis added).
44. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385,
1388–89 (1992) (“[A]n amendment that forbade the states from abridging privileges or
immunities would ban caste legislation with respect to citizens’ rights . . . .”).
45. CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 15–16
(2015) [hereinafter EQUAL CITIZENSHIP] (giving similar equal-citizenship-focused reading, and
noting Republican acknowledgment during Reconstruction of the Clause’s imprecise
boundaries).
46. Harrison, supra note 44, at 1389; cf. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 855 (2010)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“To be sure, interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause may
produce hard questions. But they will have the advantage of being questions the Constitution asks
us to answer.”).
OF JAMES
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“very cautious and moderate” in inferring tacit exceptions,47 while
Wilson in 1790 urged the “greatest circumspection.”48
One way to be cautious and circumspect is to carefully examine
how interpretive domain-restriction conventions have been used in the
past. Made-up interpretive tacit domain restrictions give others reason
to be skeptical. Loyal denominatorism, however, need not resort to ad
hocery. It can rely on a tacit restriction well-recognized long before the
Constitution was adopted: the suspension of friendship-presupposing
relationships while their constituents are at war with each other. This
rule undergirds the consensus the Court noted in 1869 in Texas v. White:
“All admit that, during this condition of civil war, the rights of the State
as a member, and of her people as citizens of the Union, were
suspended.”49
A. Commentators
A long line of thinkers about the law of armed conflict have held
that friendly commerce among the subjects of warring powers is
implicitly suspended during war. Grotius explained in 1625, “War
denounced against a Sovereign, is presumed at the same Time to be
denounced, not only against all his Subjects, but also others who shall
join him, and who ought to be considered, in Regard to him, only as an
Accessory.”50 Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui explained in 1747 why treaties
of commerce were tacitly restricted during war: “As soon as war has
been declared against a sovereign, it is presumed to be declared at the
same time not only against all his subjects, who, in conjunction with him,
form one moral person.”51
Vattel framed this rule as a “tacit supposition of the continuance of
peace” in 1758:
The conventions, the treaties made with a nation, are broken or
annulled by a war arising between the contracting parties, either
because those compacts are grounded on a tacit supposition of the
continuance of peace, or because each of the parties, being

47. VATTEL, supra note 25, at 430.
48. WILSON, supra note 27, at 924.
49. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 727 (1869).
50. 3 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1265 (Richard Tuck ed., 2005)
(1625) (bk. 3, ch. 3, § 9); cf. id. at 1281 (bk. 3., ch. 4, § 8) (“[W]hen War is proclaimed against a
Nation, it is at the same Time proclaimed against all of that Nation . . . .”).
51. 2 JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 485
(Petter Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., 2006) (1748) (bk. 2, pt. 4, ch. 4, § 20).

GREEN 12.8.17 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/18/2017 2:46 PM

LOYAL DENOMINATORISM AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

179

authorised to deprive his enemy of what belongs to him, takes from
him those rights which he had conferred on him by treaty.52

Vattel’s basic rule is that agreements intended to govern hostile
relationships would still be in effect during a war—the Geneva
Conventions governing jus in bello would be obvious modern
examples—but that amity-presupposing agreements like treaties of
commerce would not. This rule has been followed with remarkable
unanimity by later interpreters. Chancellor James Kent held in 1832
that “obligations of treaties are dissipated by hostility” except for
“stipulations which contemplate a state of future war, and make
provision for such an exigency.”53 Henry Wheaton, citing Vattel and
Kent, noted in 1836, “Treaties, properly so called, or foedera, are those
of friendship and alliance, commerce and navigation . . . which even if
perpetual in terms, expire of course . . . [i]n case of war between the
contracting parties; unless such stipulations as are made expressly with
a view to a rupture . . . .”54
B. Cases
A long line of cases and arbitrations has applied this distinction
between hostility-presupposing and amity-presupposing agreements.
This includes a surprisingly large number related to the suspension of
the 1794 Jay Treaty during the War of 1812.55 In 1814, the Supreme
Court through Justice Johnson noted that war cut off any “[i]ntercourse
inconsistent with actual hostility,” such as ordinary commerce.56 The
Court explained, “In the state of war, nation is known to nation only by
their armed exterior; each threatening the other with conquest or
annihilation. The individuals who compose the belligerent states, exist,
as to each other, in a state of utter occlusion. If they meet, it is only in
combat.”57 Following Grotius, Burlamaqui, and Vattel, Chancellor Kent
decided in 1819, “[T]he idea that any commercial intercourse or pacific
52. VATTEL, supra note 25, at 576 (3.10, § 175). Vattel then made an exception for “those
treaties by which certain things are stipulated in case of a rupture,” reasoning that “by treaties of
this nature, we mean to provide for what shall be observed in case of a rupture,” and so “we
renounce the right of cancelling them by a declaration of war.” Id. at 576–77.
53. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 165 (1826).
54. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (section 3.2.8) (1836); see
also id. at 369 (section 4.4.3) (“[D]ebts previously contracted between the respective subjects,
though the remedy for their recovery is suspended during the war, are revived on the restoration
of peace.”).
55. Most of these provisions concerned the relationship between the United States and
Canada, especially Atlantic fishing rights. See, e.g., infra note 61 and accompanying text.
56. The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 163 (1814).
57. Id. at 160–61.
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dealing could lawfully subsist between them [American citizens and
British subjects], without the clear and express sanction of the
government, is utterly inconsistent with the new class of duties growing
out of a state of war.”58 This rule applied “even though no express
prohibition of trade should be issued.”59 In 1823, the Supreme Court
held that “treaties stipulating for permanent rights, and general
arrangements, and professing to aim at perpetuity” were not
completely abrogated by war, but “only suspended while it lasts.”60 The
abrogation-versus-suspension issue, still involving the War of 1812, was
at stake in the 1910 fisheries dispute between the U.S. and Britain.61
In 1920, applying the same friendship-presupposing-versus-warcompatible distinction set out by Vattel, Kent, and Wheaton, future
Justice Cardozo waxed lyrical on the difficulty of determining whether
a particular treaty presupposed friendship between warring nations:
The effect of war upon the existing treaties of belligerents is one of
the unsettled problems of the law . . . . International law to-day does
not preserve treaties or annul them regardless of the effects
produced. It deals with such problems pragmatically, preserving or
annulling as the necessities of war exact. It establishes standards, but
it does not fetter itself with rules . . . . This does not mean, of course,
that there are not some classes of treaties about which there is
general agreement. Treaties of alliance fall. Treaties of boundary or
cession, “dispositive” or “transitory” conventions, survive . . . . So, of
course, do treaties which regulate the conduct of hostilities . . . .
Intention in such circumstances is clear. These instances do not
represent distinct and final principles. They are illustrations of the
same principle. They are applications of a standard. When I ask what
that principle or standard is, and endeavor to extract it from the long
chapters in the books, I get this, and nothing more, that provisions
compatible with a state of hostilities, unless expressly terminated,
will be enforced, and those incompatible rejected.62

Cardozo agreed with the Institute of International Law: “Treaties
of alliance, those which establish a protectorate or a sphere of influence,
58. Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438, 447 (N.Y. 1819).
59. Id. at 460.
60. Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 494–95
(1823).
61. See Arnold Pronto, The Effect of War on Law—What Happens to Their Treaties when
States Go to War?, 2 CAMB. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 227, 228 (2013) (“Contemporary international
law recognises [sic] an intermediate position, whereby treaties between parties to an armed
conflict might be automatically suspended for the duration of the conflict, only to be revived
afterwards . . . .”).
62. Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 240–41 (1920).
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and generally treaties of a political nature, are, it is said, dissolved.”63
The “political” language goes back at least to Carlos Calvo’s 1863
French treatise: “[A]ll are agreed in admitting the rupture of
conventional ties concluded expressly with a view to a state of peace,
of those whose special object is to promote relations of harmony
between nation and nation, such as treaties of amity, of alliance, and
other acts of the same nature having a political character.”64 Cecil Hurst
noted in 1922, “In general . . . treaties between the belligerents
concluded with a political object are abrogated by war.”65
In 1929, the Supreme Court used similar “political character”
language to describe which agreements would be inconsistent with war:
The law of the subject is still in the making, and, in attempting to
formulate principles at all approaching generality, courts must
proceed with a good deal of caution. But there seems to be fairly
common agreement that at least the following treaty obligations
remain in force: stipulations in respect of what shall be done in a
state of war; treaties of cession, boundary, and the like; provisions
giving the right to citizens or subjects of one of the high contracting
powers to continue to hold and transmit land in the territory of the
other; and, generally, provisions which represent completed acts. On
the other hand, treaties of amity, of alliance, and the like, having a
political character, the object of which is to promote relations of
harmony between nation and nation, are generally regarded as
belonging to the class of treaty stipulations that are absolutely
annulled by war.66

Later cases67 and the ALI’s 1987 Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States68 follow Techt and Karnuth as the
latest word on the wartime treaty-suspension rule.
States’ powers under the Constitution presuppose friendship and
amity between states and the Union. Whatever difficulties exist in
classifying wartime-suspended versus wartime-operational agreements,
63. Id. at 242.
64. J.B. Moore, The Effect of War on Public Debts and on Treaties—The Case of the Spanish
Indemnity, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 220 (1901) (translating and quoting “the great work of Calvo,”
Droit Int., 4th ed., IV, 65, sec. I, noting that this rule was “universally accepted”).
65. Cecil J. Hurst et al., The Effect of War on Treaties, 2 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 37, 42 (1922).
66. Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231, 236–37 (1929) (citation omitted and emphasis
added).
67. See e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947) (“There may of course be such an
incompatibility between a particular treaty provision and the maintenance of a state of war as to
make clear that it should not be enforced.”).
68. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THIRD, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 336, reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (noting Techt, Karnuth, and Clark).
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States’ political powers in the federal government in Articles I, II, and
V are an easy case: they are inconsistent with a state of war, and hence
are suspended.
In 1969, Article 73 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
shelved the question of wartime treaty suspension.69 In 2011, however,
the International Law Commission submitted draft articles to the
United Nations General Assembly on the issue. The proposal follows
cases like Karnuth and Techt in holding that war is incompatible with
“political” agreements.70 Proposed Article 7 refers to an appendix
listing several sorts of agreements which may “continue in operation,
in whole or in part, during armed conflict.”71 Among these are
agreements establishing international organizations,72 which are close
analogues to the Constitution’s establishment of the federal
government. Such organizations can continue to operate during armed
conflict, but “the continued participation of its members in the
activities of the international organization” may, in some cases, be
suspended.73 While it does not squarely resolve the issue posed during
the Civil War, these comments on the power to participate in
international organizations come the closest to framing the issue at
stake during the Civil War. The framing suggests that current
international law commentators recognize that the rationale of the rule
regarding the watime suspension of friendship-presupposing
agreements would apply to the participation of states in the federal
government.
There is no principled distinction that prevents the tacitsupposition-of-peace principle from applying to states’ powers under
the Constitution. Tacit quantifier domain restriction is a general
phenomenon of language, and is not limited to agreements like treaties
between full nation states. If a peacetime-presupposition interpretive
convention applies to private contracts, treaties, statutes, and
regulations, it naturally applies to constitutions too. This does not mean
that the Constitution has no force during a war. Vattel and those
following him were perfectly aware that many treaty provisions do
contemplate war without presupposing continued amity and friendship
69. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 73, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969) (refusing to “prejudge” issue).
70. Report from the United Nations, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on
Treaties, with Commentaries 7–8 nn.395–96 (2011), goo.gl/FkpUON.
71. Id. at 21.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 37 (noting the draft would not “prejudice” the issue).
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between the contracting parties.
The Constitution likewise
contemplates war in distributing war powers among Congress,74 the
President,75 and the States,76 limiting habeas suspension to “Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion,”77 and distinguishing between the rules for
“time of peace” and “time of war.”78 But it does not contemplate war
by states against the federal government. Ex Parte Milligan, for instance,
rightly struck down the use of military commissions to try cases in
locations where courts are operating:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times and under all
circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences
was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions
can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government.79

The suspension of states’ powers while they engage in illegal war is
not based on a general suspension of the Constitution during war; it is
limited only to relationships between the parties at war with each other.
Lambdin Milligan could not himself be presumed to be at war with the
federal government prior to adjudication; his constitutional rights were
not suspended. But states that had formally passed resolutions of
secession were at war with the Union; as the Court noted just three
years later, their constitutional rights and powers were suspended.
C. Was the Rebellion Confined to Individuals, Not States Themselves?
Perhaps, though, the states were not actually in rebellion. When
Mississippi said that its ties with the Union were dissolved, if secession
was illegal, those ties were not actually dissolved. However, Mississippi
did engage in war against the Union, and that is enough for suspension
of its constitutional rights.
Harrison has suggested in conversation that Articles I and V are
different because Article I powers require the existence of a lawful
apparatus of officials to operate, but Article V naysaying powers do not.
A group of legislators, or perhaps even a state legislature itself, can
become disloyal by passing an ordinance of secession, and so rendering
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–16.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
U.S. CONST. amend. III.
71 U.S. (2 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1866).
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a state unable to exercise Article I or positive Article V powers. But,
Harrison argues, a state itself cannot be disloyal, because if secession is
illegal, there is no such thing as a disloyal, rebel state. Thus, the story
would go, Southern states still possessed both Article I and Article V
rights, but were simply unable to exercise Article I and Article V “yes”
powers, for lack of lawfully-appointed legislatures. The Article V “no”
power, however, requires no officials.
This disanalogy is uncompelling; it is no more incongruous to label
states “rebel states,” and yet still states in the Union, subject to the
federal government’s authority, than to label individual Americans
“rebels,” and yet still Americans subject to the federal government’s
authority. States act through their duly-authorized agents; qui facit per
alium, facit per se (he who acts through another acts himself). It is no
more impossible for a state to rebel than for a corporation to commit a
crime.80 “If . . . the invisible, intangible essence or air which we term a
corporation can level mountains, fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks,
and run railroad cars on them, it can intend to do it, and can act therein
as well viciously as virtuously.”81
The idea that states themselves, by their nature, cannot rebel or be
guilty of disloyalty is wrong for the same reason as the idea—“the old
and exploded doctrine,” the Supreme Court called it in 190982—that
corporations can never commit crimes. The chief reason to adopt those
conclusions uses the ipso facto ultra vires fallacy, a close cousin of the
“no true Scotsman” fallacy: if an apparent state actor rebels, he must
not really be acting on behalf of the state, but must be, in virtue of his
rebellion, merely on a frolic of his own.83 No true agent of the state
would rebel; no true corporate employee would commit a crime.

80. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson. R. R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492–93 (1909)
(recognizing that corporations could commit crimes despite the common law doctrine claiming
that they could not). See Christopher R. Green, Theseus, Incorporated: Philosophy of Mind,
Material Constitution, and the Ontology of the Criminal Law, for my philosophical defense,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1949507. See Christopher R. Green, Punishing Corporations:
The Food-Chain Schizophrenia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. L. REV. 197
(2008) for a survey of the unanimity among the states, both in criminal law and punitive damages,
that corporations may properly be punished.
81. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson, 212 U.S. at 493 (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW
COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW SYSTEM OF LEGAL EXPOSITION 255–56
(§ 417) (8th ed. 1892)).
82. Id. at 496.
83. See, e.g., Orr v. Bank of United States, 1 Ohio 36, 41 (1822) (“Trespass does not lie
against a corporation, viz: by the name of corporation, but against the persons who did it, by their
proper name . . . . As outlawry does not lie against an aggregate corporation, therefore trespass
does not lie against them . . . .”) (citation omitted).
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Definitions of “state” or “corporate action” that simply exclude certain
state or corporate actions a priori as impossible are not likely to be
useful legally.
It is true that the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases held that
Congress “cannot declare war against a state” and that the President
may not “initiate or declare a war . . . against a . . . State.”84 But this is
not because the states may not initiate war with the Union, for in the
next breath the Court calls the Confederate states “states in
rebellion.”85 The states obviously rebelled through their secession
conventions. The Court noted the consensus six years later: “All admit
that, during this condition of civil war, the rights of the State as a
member, and of her people as citizens of the Union, were suspended.”86
The Prize Cases Court did not establish any sort of principle that
secession stained only individuals and not states; secession affected the
rights of both.
III. END-OF-WAR LAW: VICTORS’ POWER TO DELAY A CONDITION
OF PEACE
If language has tacit restrictions on its coverage, and if one of those
tacit restrictions is that friendship-presupposing agreements between
are suspended “during wartime,” who decides how long that lasts? The
answer is, under well-established, uncontroversial armed-conflict law,
as long as the victor deems it necessary to be secure in its victory.
Standard jus post bellum and jus victoriae rules of armed-conflict law
give victors a broad right to impose conditions before restoring the
legal status quo ante.
A. History and Philosophy
In 1532, Francisco de Vitoria first described the right of those
fighting in a just war to go beyond the specific object of the war to
establish peace:
[A] prince may . . . in a just war and do whatever is necessary in order
to obtain peace and security from the enemy; for example, destroy
an enemy’s fortress and even build one on enemy soil, if this be
necessary in order to avert a dangerous attack of the enemy. This is
proved by the fact that, as said above, the end and aim of war is
84. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black.) 635, 668 (1863).
85. Id. at 671.
86. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 727 (1869); see also infra notes 132, 133 and
accompanying text.
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peace and security. Therefore a belligerent may do everything
requisite to obtain peace and security.87

Vitoria also approved using war to avenge wrong, a much more
controversial point. But it was uncontroversial that those fighting a just
war may properly demand security and freedom from risk regarding
the object of the war, beyond bare attainment of the object itself.88
In 1625, Hugo Grotius also noted the victor’s right to “security”:
“[A]s far as his own Security will permit it, it is honourable (to a
Conqueror) to shew Clemency and Liberality.”89 This fits with his
general comment that in self-defense, “[I may] invade and seize upon
what belongs to another” and “detain it till my Security be sufficiently
provided for.”90 Samuel Pufendorf repeated the same idea in 1673:
“Humanity commands me, as far as the Fury of War will permit, that I
do my Enemy no more Harm, than the Defence or Vindication of my
Right requires, with Care to my Security for the Time to come.”91 Jean
Barbeyrac explained in a 1724 note on Grotius,
[T]he Victor, who has possessed himself of an Enemy’s Country,
may command in it, whilst he holds it, and not resign it, till he has
good Security, that he shall either obtain, or possess without Hazard,
what is necessary for the Satisfaction and Amends he has a Right to
exact by the Methods of Force.92

In 1758, Vattel gave the general understanding at the time of the
immediate background to the Constitution:
When a sovereign has been compelled to take up arms for just and
important reasons, he may carry on the operations of war till he has
attained its lawful end, which is, to procure justice and safety . . . . [I]f
we have to do with a perfidious enemy, it would be imprudent to
trust either his words or his oaths. In such case, justice allows and
prudence requires that we should avail ourselves of a successful war,
and follow up our advantages, till we have humbled a dangerous and

87. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, ON THE LAW OF WAR § 18 (1532), reprinted in VITORIA:
POLITICAL WRITINGS 305 (Anthony Padgen & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991) (emphasis added).
88. See infra notes 89 to 100 and accompanying text.
89. 3 GROTIUS, supra note 50, at 1586 (§ 3.20.50.1) (emphasis added).
90. Id., at 1186 (§ 3.1.2.2) (emphasis added). Grotius here cites his earlier comment that one
fighting a just war may take even neutrals’ property as long as “he takes nothing but what is
necessary for his Security.” 2 GROTIUS, supra note 50, at 437 (§ 2.2.10).
91. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN 240 (chapter 16) (Knud Haakonssen
ed., 2003) (1673) (emphasis added).
92. 3 GROTIUS, supra note 50, at 1374 n.1 (§ 3.8.1.1) (note added in French edition by Jean
Barbeyrac; see 1 id. at x).
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excessive power, or compelled the enemy to give us sufficient
security . . . .93

Kant’s comments on the jus post bellum in his 1796 Science of Right
(“Right after War,” he termed it94) are also instructive. He sets much
stricter limits on transitioning from a state of war to one of peace than
does Vitoria: neither punishment nor restitution of the cost of war is
allowed.95 However, like earlier writers, Kant thinks those who win a
just war are entitled to security against an unjust aggressor: “The
conqueror lays down the conditions under which he will agree with the
conquered power to form the conclusion of Peace.”96 Kant denies that
a victor has “the right to partition and appropriate the country, so as to
make a state as it were disappear from the earth.”97 He does, however,
note that in giving security to the victor, the people may be required to
“adopt such a new constitution as by its nature would be unfavourable
to the inclination for war.”98 This is exactly what the North imposed on
the South in 1867. Victory in a just war entitles the winner to get rid of
risks and inclinations, not merely to repel an unjust act of aggression.99
B. Reconstruction
An armed-conflict winner’s need for at least some measures of
security were generally acknowledged during Reconstruction. There
was great dispute about how large these measures should be, but it was

93. VATTEL, supra note 25, at 654 (4.1, § 6).
94. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT (§ 58) 137 (William Hastie
trans.,1887) (1796).
95. Id. at 137–38 (“Neither the conquered State nor its Subjects, lose their political liberty
by conquest of the country, so as that the former should be degraded to a colony, or the latter to
slaves; for otherwise it would have been a penal war, which is contradictory in itself.”); id. at 138
(“Still less can Slavery be deduced as a rightful institution, from the conquest of a people in war;
for this would assume that the war was of a punitive nature.”).
96. Id. at 137.
97. Id. at 139 (§ 60). Note the similarity between Kant’s resistance to a power to destroy the
existence of a defeated foe and Jacob Howard’s position in February 1865 that Southern states
must eventually be restored to their earlier position. STS, supra note 1, at 36 n.87 and
accompanying text.
98. Id.
99. I cannot resist including a fascinating tidbit about Kant’s jus post bellum discussion that
touches on the legality of secession. In the next section after the comments just quoted, Kant
proposes a “Permanent Congress of Nations” that could establish a “real state of Peace.” Id. at
139 (§ 61) (emphasis added). Kant then makes a passing comment on the indissolubility of the
American Union: “By such a Congress is here meant only a voluntary combination of different
States that would be dissoluble at any time, and not such a union as is embodied in the United
States of America, founded upon a political constitution, and therefore indissoluble.” Id. at 140
(emphasis added).

GREEN 12.8.17 (DO NOT DELETE)

188

12/18/2017 2:46 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 13:1

generally well-understood that the losers of a war had no right to have
their surrender taken unquestioningly at face value. Proffered
surrenders had to be accepted, and by the proper authority. Article 156
of the 1863 Lieber Code, for instance, noted that in receiving promises
from surrendering soldiers or armies, a victor may decide “whether
reliance can be placed upon such oaths.” Even those Southerners who
thought that the Article VI oath was enough must have seen that only
a sincere Article VI oath would do the job. Such sincerity could only
be judged, moreover, by some agent of the victorious North, rather than
by surrendering former Confederates. Eric McKitrick’s comprehensive
history of the conflict between the President and Congress noted the
consensus: “[E]veryone, including President Johnson, understood . . .
there had to be terms. The South would have to do things, and the North
would have to say what they were.”100
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction’s report rooted the delay
in Southern representation squarely on the North’s jus post bellum
rights. The Union could demand “adequate guarantees against future
treason and rebellion” and impose “such conditions as, in the opinion
of Congress, the security of the country and its institutions may
demand.”101 It was “madness and folly” to say that “conquered enemies
have the right, and shall be permitted at their own pleasure and on their
own terms, to participate in making laws for their conquerors.”102
Former Confederates were “entitled only by public law to such rights,
privileges, and conditions as might be vouchsafed by the conqueror.”103
C. Law
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the general right of
victors to demand further post-war security. For instance, in 1871, the
Court upheld a law that tolled statutes of limitations during the war,
even after the surrenders of 1865. The Court commented, “[T]he [war]
power is not limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the
insurgent forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against
the immediate renewal of the conflict and to remedy the evils which
have arisen from its rise and progress.”104 This was not mere special
100. ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 186 (1960); see also
id. at 23 (summarizing the consensus from earlier writers like Grotius: “[T]he victor needs to be
assured that . . . his objectives have been accomplished.”).
101. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION xx (1866).
102. Id.
103. Id. at xix.
104. Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 507 (1871).
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pleading during Reconstruction; cases after both World War I105 and
World War II106 followed the same principle. The Court explained in
1947, “The cessation of hostilities does not necessarily end the war
power. . . . [T]he war power . . . is plainly adequate to deal with problems
of law enforcement which arise during the period of hostilities, but do
not cease with them.”107 Security for the victors is a standard,
uncontroverted element of current jus post bellum law.108 To be secure
in one’s victory is what it means to win a war, rather than to simply
disperse opposing armies. The Fourteenth Amendment and
Reconstruction Act are similar to demands regularly and legitimately
made by victorious parties in armed conflict today:
Modern peace agreements regularly contain a large regulatory
component, including numerous provisions on the organization of
public authority and individual rights, such as provisions on
transitional government, claims mechanisms, human rights clauses,
provisions on demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, as
well as provisions on individual accountability.109

Jus post bellum rules are a byproduct of the general need for the
losers in a war to submit to the victors; therefore, they apply both to
civil and international wars. As Jens David Ohlin recently remarked,
Vattel coined the phrase “common law of war” to refer to “customary
rules regarding warfare which applied during all armed conflicts—
whether they were classified as international or internal wars.”110 Stahn
and Kleffner’s recent study of jus post bellum likewise makes clear that

105. Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919) (quoting same
language from Stewart, “The power is not limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the
[insurgent] forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal
of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and progress.”).
106. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947) (following
Stewart and Hamilton, “The cessation of hostilities does not necessarily end the war power. . . .
that the war power includes the power to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and
progress and continues during that emergency.”).
107. Id.
108. See generally JUS POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO
PEACE (Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner eds., 2008) [hereinafter JPB].
109. Carsten Stahn, Jus post bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s), in JPB, supra note 108, at
100.
110. Jens David Ohlin, The Common Law of War, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 493, 499 (2016);
see also id. at 518 (“[E]ven civil wars are governed by natural law through the common law of
war”); id. at 518–19 (quoting the Prize Cases and Vattel, “[t]his being the case, it is very evident
that the common laws of war—those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honour—ought to be
observed by both parties in every civil war”).
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the general problem of security for the victor applies both to civil and
international armed conflict.111
IV. THE SEPARATION OF WAR POWER
Granted, then, that the victorious Union could delay Southern
participation in the statutory and constitutional lawmaking processes
until it thought it was safe, did the Union in fact do so? The first issue
here is, who should count as “the Union”—the President or Congress?
Secondly, did Congress act with enough clarity to suspend Article V
powers, if it did not pass a resolution saying that the Amendment had
been adopted with only loyal-state ratifications? I explain here why the
war-declaration power puts Congress, not the President, in charge of
end-of-wartime-suspension decisionmaking, and that Congress was not
required to spell out the application to the Article V denominator in so
many words.
A. Congressional Power Over Wartime-Restriction Timing
The first issue is the easier one: a congressional jus post bellum
power to delay a condition of peace is the unavoidable corollary of a
congressional jus ad bellum power to “declare War.”112 Even if the
President has the power to repel sudden attacks or initiate hostilities, it
is textually unavoidable that Congress can, on its own, “declare War.”
Maybe the President can too,113 but Congress has the power to declare
that a state of war exists. And the jus post bellum power is simply this
power set in a time frame: the power to say that a state of war still exists.
Even if, for whatever reason, the condition of hostility does not amount
to a “war,” congressional power to call forth the militia to “suppress
Insurrections”114 entails a power to set the criteria for when an
insurrection exists. If Congress says one exists, it does, and if Congress
says one still exists, it still does.

111. See Andre Nollkaemper & Nico Schrijver, JPB, supra note 108, at v (“[T]he concept of
jus post bellum . . . has an established background in just war doctrine. But it has significant
potential in its application to the situation following modern armed conflicts, irrespective whether
of an interstate or intrastate nature.”); Stahn, supra note 109, at 106 (“A jus post bellum would
have to apply in the aftermath of civil wars.”).
112. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 11.
113. Michael D. Ramsey, The Textual Limit on the President’s War Powers, NAT’L
CONSTITUTION CTR., https://goo.gl/TWpXFr (noting, though, there is a “widespread consensus
that the Declare War Clause limits the President’s power to initiate the use of military force”).
114. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 15.
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Vattel, in considering how the law of war might apply in different
countries, noted this point: as a matter of logic and domestic law, the
power to delay the end of a war is in the same hands as the power to
begin a war. The power to “judge of the causes and reasons for which
war is to be undertaken” entails the power “to point out the time when
it shall be discontinued.”115 Grotius agreed: “They who have Power to
begin a War, have likewise Power to enter upon a Treaty to finish it.”116
If the president has an independent power to decide that a state of war
exists—perhaps because we have been suddenly attacked—he may also
have the power to decide that such a condition persists. But whatever
the President’s powers, Congress certainly has the power to declare that
the conditions of wartime still exist. Without congressional
acquiescence, the president cannot—as Andrew Johnson hoped—
declare that the war is definitively over.
A treaty might also end a war, and so (two thirds of) the Senate
together with the President could cut the House out of the peacedelaying process.117 Once peace had been re-established, Congress
could declare a new war, but it could not continue the old one; its power
would thus be subject to the jus ad bellum (the rules relating to going
to war), not the jus post bellum (those relating to ending a war). No
such treaty, though, ever ended the Civil War.
President Johnson did declare on August 20, 1866, that “the said
insurrection is at an end and that peace, order, tranquility, and civil
authority now exist in and throughout the whole of the United States
of America.”118 He claimed that because peace was re-established,
“that such constituent States must necessarily be, and by the
Constitution and laws of the United States are made equals, and placed
upon a like footing as to political rights, immunities, dignity and power
with the several States with which they are united.”119 Congress,
however, disagreed, and its war-status-declaration power trumps the
President’s. One way to see the distinction is to use J.L. Austin’s
terminology: the congressional power to declare war is, like the power
to say “with this ring I thee wed,” or “I hereby promise,” a
performative use of language. Unlike most statements about reality, for

115. VATTEL, supra note 25, at 655 (4.2, § 10).
116. 3 GROTIUS, supra note 50, at 1551 (§ 3.20.2).
117. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2 cl. 2 (stating presidential power to “make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur”).
118. Andrew Johnson, Proclamation No. 4, 14 Stat. 814, 817 (August 20, 1866).
119. Id. at 816.
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Congress to simply say that a state of war exists is for Congress to make
such a state of war exist (if it did not already). Presidential statements
about peace and war, by contrast, are statements about an
independently-existing reality, not constitutive elements of that reality
itself: Austin would call them “constantive” uses of language.120
The only early source explicitly considering the extent of
congressional and presidential powers to end wartime suspensions,
William Rawle, makes clear that the President cannot restore rights
suspended by war on his own. Rawle noted in 1825 that a presidential
truce, though it could for the time being terminate “hostilities,” cannot
“revive treaties which were broken by the commencement of the war,
or restore rights of any sort, which were suspended by it.”121 Rawle’s
brief comment encapsulates almost the entire loyal-denominator
argument: wartime agreement-suspension, the jus post bellum
distinction between ending hostility and establishing peace, and the
lack of presidential power outside the context of a treaty to exercise jus
post bellum power.
B. Did Congress Pull the Trigger?
In addition to his arguments discussed above,122 Harrison has urged
that Congress did not “pull the trigger.” He elaborates:
Although the reduced denominator theory has merits, it is also
subject to doubt. While many Republicans endorsed it to varying
degrees, they still did not pull the trigger and proclaim the
Fourteenth Amendment ratified by three-fourths of the represented
states. Instead, they waited until three-fourths of all the states had,
in their view at least, agreed to the Amendment. It seems that they
were not prepared to try the more aggressive theory unless they
absolutely had to.123

Harrison is right about the uneasiness of several Republicans; as
documented at length in the companion to this Article, a few significant
Republicans, most prominently Lincoln in his last public address and
Senators John Sherman, Oliver Morton, and George Edmunds,

120. J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 25 (J. O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds.,
2d ed. 1962) (performative utterance defined “as not, or not merely, saying something, but doing
something, and as not a true or false report of something”); id. at 3 (“true or false statements”
deemed “constative”).
121. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 110 (2d ed. 1829).
122. See supra notes 11, 29, 32, and 34 and accompanying text.
123. Harrison, supra note 5, at 422 (emphasis added).
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professed agnosticism about the size of the Article V denominator,
though many more Republicans explicitly advocated a loyal
denominator.124 Agnosticism is only the rejection of a loyal
denominator if a loyal denominator required specific Congressional
action. But Congress had no special power to “proclaim the Fourteenth
Amendment ratified.” There was no trigger to pull.
Article V is clear on the timing of new amendments, and Congress
is simply not involved: proposals “shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified . . . .”125
Congressional power to say that the Amendment was ratified, like the
President’s power to say that the nation was now at peace, is not the
power to make it so.126 As Michael Stokes Paulsen puts it, “nothing in
the text of Article V remotely suggests . . . a substantive commitment”
of amendment-validity issues to Congress.127 Neither Congress in July
1868, nor Secretary of State Seward in his proclamations about the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, claimed the right to
conclusively resolve the ratification-legitimacy issue for everyone.128
Three days after the loyal-denominator threshold was passed, Reverdy
Johnson rightly told Republicans who were considering a resolution
declaring the Fourteenth Amendment to already be the law that others
might disagree with it:
When will the Constitution be amended by the ratification of three
fourths of those States that are represented? Who is to decide that?
124. See STS, supra note 1, at 37 n.95, 62 nn.236–38 and accompanying text.
125. U.S. CONST. art. V.
126. See J.L. Austin, supra note 120 (defining performative utterance “as not, or not merely,
saying something, but doing something, and as not a true or false report of something”).
127. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of
the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 707 (1993). Paulsen compellingly takes down
the contrary reasoning of two separate opinions in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)—Chief
Justice Hughes’s statement that Congress has “control over the promulgation of the adoption of
the amendment,” id. at 450, and Justice Black’s view that “Congress has sole and complete control
over the amending process,” id. at 459. Paulsen also notes that many earlier cases had adjudicated
challenges to amendments without taking Congress’s word on the issue as in any way binding; see
id. at 712 n.123 (citing United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) (answering an attack on 18th
Amendment); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (answering an attack on 19th Amendment);
National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (answering an attack on 18th Amendment);
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 231 (1920) (answering an attack on 19th Amendment); Hawke v. Smith,
253 U.S. 221 (1920) (answering attack on 18th Amendment); and Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (answering an attack on 11th Amendment).
128. Paulsen, supra note 127, at 712 (“[I]f the views of Seward and Congress in 1868 count as
precedent, they should be precedent as to the merits of the specific issues there addressed, not for
the proposition that the decision is committed to the political branches—still less to Congress in
particular. Neither Congress in its proclamations nor Seward in his made any such grandiose
assertion.”).
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That is an open question, and must be an open question just as much
after you have declared that it is to be a part of the Constitution
when ratified by three fourths as if you leave it blank. If in point of
law the States that are now represented are the States to whom it is
to be referred and by whom is to be ratified the constitutional
amendment proposed by Congress, then the Constitution of the
United States will be altered in that respect; but if it is to be
submitted to more than the States that are represented in Congress,
that is to say, to all the States, the question will be open whether
Congress declares it or not . . . .129

In short, Congress did not have the power, simply by saying so, to
alter the Article V denominator, either to make it smaller or to make it
larger. Congress had the power under the war-declaration130 and
insurrection-suppression131 powers to recognize the continuing hostility
of the South, and a reduced Article V denominator followed from that
recognition. There is no separate amendment-recognizing power,
however, that Congress failed to deploy—no critical un-pulled trigger.
Further, cases after the war that consider whether particular rights
of Confederate states were suspended during the war do not consider
whether Congress specifically declared those particular rights to be
suspended. Texas v. White held in 1869 that the right to sell bonds was
suspended,132 while White v. Hart held in 1872 that the duty not to
impair the obligation of contracts was not suspended.133 Suspension of
rights followed as a matter of law from the (congressionallyrecognized) state of war itself.
Congress was clear in both July 1866 and March 1867 that, as far as
it was concerned, the South was still in a state of hostility, and that it
was exercising the Union’s jus post bellum/jus victoriae rights to delay
a legally-operative state of peace. In the statute readmitting Tennessee
in 1866, Congress declared that a “State government can only be
restored to its former political relations in the Union by the consent of
the law-making power of the United States.”134 “Political relations in
the Union” is a broader concept than simply “representation in

129. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1393 (February 15, 1867) (emphasis added).
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
132. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 727 (1869); see also Thomas v. Richmond, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 349, 357 (1871); Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342, 345 (1871).
133. White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 651 (1872); see also Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 610, 623 (1873); Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454, 461 (1878).
134. Joint Resolution Restoring Tennessee to her Relations to the Union, 14 Stat. 364 (1866).
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Congress,” and includes articles I, II, and V.135 The statute concluded,
“the State of Tennessee is hereby restored to her former proper,
practical relations to the Union, and is again entitled to be represented
by senators and representatives in Congress.”136 Congress thereby
declared that peace under the law was re-established between the
Union and Tennessee. But Congress’s explicit insistence on affirmative
congressional consent, plus silence regarding other states, made clear
that a legal peace was re-established only in Tennessee.
The Reconstruction Act of March 1867 also made this clear: the
governments of the “rebel States” were “provisional only, and in all
respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States at any
time to abolish, modify, control, or supersede the same.”137 By making
it very plain that the South was still under wartime legal disabilities,
Congress pulled the still-at-war-declaration trigger quite
straightforwardly. Johnson’s veto of the Reconstruction Act also makes
clear the hinge on which the legitimacy turned: whether 1867 should be
deemed “a time of peace.”138 In the Reconstruction Act, Congress—the
branch with explicit power to decide the division between wartime and
peacetime—said no.
Finally, even if, as Amar contends,139 the process of reconstruction
during 1867 and 1868 is construed as genuine Southern part-authorship
of the Fourteenth Amendment, coercion in that process must be
evaluated against the baseline of what Congress would have been
allowed to do legally. Congress told states that they would only be
admitted to Congress if they agreed to the Fourteenth Amendment.140
As explained below, this is rightly seen as impairing the pretension of
free, unforced “reflection and choice” in our processes of constitutional
adoption that Americans have made since the Founding. But if
Congress had the power to declare the Fourteenth Amendment law
under a loyal-denominator theory, then the threatened alternative was
no worse (on this score) than what Congress asked former
135. See id.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, 14 Stat. 428,
429 § 6 (1867).
138. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1730 (1867).
139. See AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 87 (2012) (“[Congress] ultimately opted to include ex-Confederate
states in the amendment process.”).
140. See 14 Stat. at 429 § 5 (An act responding to the difficulties of loyalists trying to vote,
that provided that military authorities conduct elections for the state constitutional convention
pursuant to basic reconstruction laws).
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Confederates to do themselves. As Mitch Berman has noted, a
relatively stable scholarly consensus has emerged around the idea that
“a conditional proposal is coercive if it would be wrongful for the
maker to do as it threatens.”141 Under that theory, resolving the
lawfulness of hypothetical Congressional action actually imposing a
loyal denominator is essential to deciding whether the invitation to the
South to ratify “on its own” was improperly coercive. A far cleaner
interpretation of Congress’s action was simply that the Fourteenth
Amendment actually was the law, so that the Reconstruction Act
should not be seen as a conditional threat at all. But even if the
Reconstruction Act was a conditional threat, it avoids improper
coercion only if the loyal-denominator theory could have been proper.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Aside from any change to the constitutional author, loyal
denominatorism can also help lay to rest any embarrassment with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s provenance that might otherwise hinder its
energetic enforcement. This Section briefly considers four other
implications of seeing the Fourteenth Amendment as authored only by
the loyal North. The change is important both for our understanding of
the nature of the Constitution’s status as an act of self-government and
for our understanding of how the Constitution should be interpreted.
A. Avoiding Ackerman, Amar, Colby, and Harrison’s Lessons:
Preserving Government by “Reflection and Choice”
Loyal denominatorism can rebut the practical implications of
alternative theories: that is, help resist Ackerman’s non-Article-V
amendment power, Harrison’s hyperformalism, Amar’s general federal
power over state suffrage rules, and Colby’s non-originalism.142 The
victorious, loyal North reflected, free of coercion, on whether to adopt
the Fourteenth Amendment; it was a product of federally-structured
“reflection and choice” rather than “accident and force,” in Hamilton’s
words.143
141. See Mitchel N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in
Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1347 (2013) (“Normative theorists have
coalesced around [this view].”).
142. See supra notes 3–8, and accompanying text; STS, supra note 1, at 16–17 nn.22–25 and
accompanying text.
143. Hamilton et al., supra note 24, at 1 (“It has been frequently remarked that it seems to
have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the
important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good
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Excluding the South from constitutional co-authorship while it was
subject to the Reconstruction Act thus improves the legitimacy and
integrity of the constitutional author. States subject to total federal
control in section 6 of the Reconstruction Act,144 as well as the martial
law in sections 1 through 4, are not the free agents who can legitimately
be taken to be authors of a Constitution based on “reflection and
choice” rather than “force.” Blackstone explained property
requirements for suffrage in terms of subjecting the poor to others’
wills:
The true reason of requiring any qualification, with regard to
property, in voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a
situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own. . . . Only
such are entirely excluded [from the suffrage], as can have no will of
their own: there is hardly a free agent to be found, but what is
entitled to vote in some place or other in the kingdom.145

Thus, suffrage entails freedom, and the “provisional only”
governments of the South were not free. Loyal denominatorism, on the
other hand, justifies the Reconstruction Act’s imposition of Fourteenth
Amendment on the South very simply: the Fourteenth Amendment
was already the law, not an act in which Congress was inviting the South
to participate as a forced co-author. If the South was an unwilling coauthor, the Fourteenth Amendment becomes a partly insincere act of
capitulation, rather than a legitimate demand. Unqualified legitimacy
for the Amendment requires a genuine expression of sovereign will.
But as Blackstone explains, such a genuine expression requires
unqualified freedom in its author, and only the North possessed such
freedom during Reconstruction. If coerced ratifications are the only
possible justification for the Fourteenth Amendment, we might have to
accept them,146 but loyal denominatorism offers another way.

government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their
political constitutions on accident and force.”). For the federally-structured aspect, see id. at 196
(Madison in Federalist 39) and infra note 154 and accompanying text.
144. 14 Stat. at 429 (“[U]ntil the people of said rebel States shall be by law admitted to
representation in the Congress of the United States,” Southern government “shall be deemed
provisional only, and in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States to
abolish, modify, control, or supersede the same” until their representatives are admitted to
Congress).
145. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *170 (emphasis added).
146. See Harrison, supra note 5, at 457 (arguing that former-Confederate ratifications may
have been coerced, but that under principles of international law, this does not invalidate the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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B. Jus post bellum, Southern Intransigence, and Lessons for
Democratic Theory
Reorienting our understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment to
see that it became law before the Reconstruction Act, rather than
because of it, does not eliminate the Act’s coercion of the South.
However, a jus post bellum frame better justifies such coercion. Amar147
and Ackerman148 are right to this extent: it is wrong to see the
Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment as the expression of “equal
sovereignty,” an idea the Court invoked incessantly in Shelby County v.
Holder.149 Justice Black’s dissent in South Carolina v. Katzenbach
accused Congress of treating the South in the Voting Rights Act as
“little more than conquered provinces.”150 Rather than shying away
from the charge, we should see Southern resistance to the principles of
the Fourteenth Amendment (and the Fifteenth Amendment) as exactly
the same sort of struggle that appears in every jus post bellum problem
following armed conflict.151 The South is more than a set of conquered
provinces, but it is not less. This is not to say that jus post bellum
problems have easy solutions. Instead, we must be patient and
persevering in pressing for the enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s principles despite Southern recalcitrance.
A stress on the coercion of the South involved in the Fourteenth
Amendment and seeing jus post bellum principles as its justification
might, however, be seen to make its troubles from the standpoint of
democratic legitimacy even worse. If the northern-denominator
Fourteenth Amendment is the act only of the North and not the whole
nation, is it really an exercise in self-government of the sort our
Constitution claims to be? The self-government question raises the
issues with which Colby’s consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment
is chiefly concerned. His assessment of the Fourteenth Amendment
focuses chiefly on the question of democratic pedigree, as opposed to
147. See Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5, supra note 7, at 109.
148. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 403–04
(President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2014) (criticizing Shelby County’s use of precedent,
especially Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), which held that actions taken by Texas in
support of the rebellion, such as the sale of bonds, were null and void).
149. See generally Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013). References to “equal
sovereignty” appear on almost every page of the relatively-short opinion. See id. at 2618, 2621,
2622, 2623, 2624, and 2630. Note the similarity to President Johnson’s view of the South. Cf. supra
note 119 and accompanying text.
150. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 360 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
151. See generally JPB, supra note 108 (reflecting on jus post bellum and the dynamic
processes and structures involved in moving from conflict to peace).
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legal legitimacy as such. His chief objection to the loyal denominator
lies not in technical issues regarding the interpretation of “three fourths
of the several States” in Article V, but on whether the Fourteenth
Amendment can be seen as a genuine exercise of popular sovereignty.
His democratic argument against the loyal denominator on that basis
is very simple: “One cannot demonstrate that a constitutional
amendment reflects a supermajoritarian consensus among the people
simply by excluding from the equation the people of the states that
rejected it.”152
The loyal denominator theory, however, does not exclude the
Southern states from the constitutional author simply because they
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment; the theory excludes them from
the power of constitutional authorship because they illegally seceded. Is
a secession-based definition of “the people,” then, democratically
legitimate? Colby evidently thinks not. We should avoid
overconfidence about the principles that govern democratic legitimacy,
but that question can be paired with another: is the distinction between
states and territories democratically legitimate? While most advocates
of the loyal Article V denominator held that former Confederate states
were still states, and not literally reduced to the status of territories,
these advocates still repeatedly used territorial metaphors to describe
the condition of the South.153 Those who venture out into the lesspopulated parts of a country are still, one might think, part of “the
152. Colby, supra note 8, at 1682.
153. See STS, supra note 1, at 35 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 533, 554)
(Senator Jacob Howard) (“[T]he United States . . . have the same power and authority over the
conquered States . . . . as the nation itself would possess over foreign territory conquered in the
same way . . . . [T]he power of the United States over a conquered State which has been in
rebellion is the ordinary power of the conqueror over conquered territory.”); id. at 78 (citing
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 89) (Representative Ebon Ingersoll) (“The late rebel
States are to all intents and purposes as much territories of the United States, subject to the
exclusive control of Congress, as are the territories of Utah, New Mexico, Montana, or any other
Territory belonging to the Government.”); id. at 83 (New York Times stating that the loyal
denominator “implies the reduction of the now excluded States to something resembling a
territorial condition.”), id. at 88 (citing New York Herald editorial, The Work Before the
Reconstruction Committee—The Right Way to Do It, 2 (February 1, 1867)) (“The duty will then
devolve upon Congress of proclaiming the amendment part and parcel of the Federal
Constitution, the supreme law of the land, binding alike upon the inside and outside States and
the Territories.”); id. at 93 (citing ISRAEL WARD ANDREWS, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 253-54 (1874)) (“A proposed Amendment to the Constitution is no more
dependent on the assent of a State holding such relation to the nation, than upon that of a
Territory.”); id. at 93 (citing J.W. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 18661876 81 (1902)) (under the loyal-denominator view, “their [Southern states’] petition for
admission or recognition as ‘States’ of the Union with the amended Constitution would imply
their assent to the Amendment as well as to every other part of the Constitution”).
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people,” but they are denied federal political authority until they
achieve—and Congress allows—statehood. Is that legitimate? To prefer
loyal states over once-rebellious ones now seeking readmission to the
Union’s political structures is no less democratically legitimate than
preferring states already in the Union over those seeking admission to
those structures for the first time.
The distinctively democratic legitimacy of a Northern-authored
Fourteenth Amendment or a Constitution imposed by earlier states on
later ones as the price of statehood depends on whether and how “the
people” may be structured. James Madison referred to one type of
structure as “the people” in Federalist 39: “[T]his assent and
ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing
one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States
to which they respectively belong.”154 Reconstruction and the
privileging of earlier states over territories impose another sort of
structure on our popular sovereign. Those lying on one side of certain
geographic, temporal, or domestic-insurrectionary boundaries, the
story would go, legitimately have different powers than those on the
other side. Established states have been around, loyally supporting the
structures of the Union, longer than territorial entities; former
Confederate states whose loyalty is subject to question are likewise
properly seen as junior partners relative to states that stuck with the
Union.
These temporal metaphors suggest that secession means forfeiting
seniority. That is, the relationships of North to South and States to
Territories are strongly akin to the relationship of Generation 1 to
Generation 2. The authority of those now dead to set rules for the living
is itself a difficult problem for democratic theory, but a tripartite
analogy—North : South :: Established States : Territories :: Generation
1 : Generation 2—may help us think about all three problems. I will
consider the analogy more fully in future work, but will give a brief
sketch here.
Importantly, the Constitution was not imposed on the South, or on
Territories, or on prospective officials today, utterly without their
consent. The South was told to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, as a
pledge of loyalty,155 if they wanted to be represented in Congress. Those

154. Hamilton et al., supra note 24, at 196.
155. See STS, supra note 1, at 46 n.138 (listing a great many Republicans who construed
Southern ratifications as pledges of loyalty, rather than as constitutional co-authorship).
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in territories are told to agree to the Constitution if they want to be in
the Union.156 The current generation is told (by Article VI’s oath
requirement) to be bound to support the Constitution if they want to be
officials.157 These acts of consent may not amount to the sort of selfgovernment that can legitimate Reconstruction, the lessened federal
rights of those living in territories, or the intergenerationally-imposed
Constitution in the eyes of our preferred democratic theory. But it
might be possible to understand the obligations of those who have
agreed to such impositions, even while we bracket the issue of the
political principles that should govern the propriety of state-toterritory, North-to-South, or intergenerational assertions of authority
themselves.
A first normative consideration is the “mind of the imposer” or
animus imponentis tradition in oath interpretation, which governs the
obligations of those taking oaths as conditions imposed by others.158
Those oaths must be governed, the tradition says, according to the way
its words would be understood by the one imposing the oath, rather
than according to any possible mental reservations in the mind of the
one agreeing to the oath (the “animus jurantis”).
As applied to Reconstruction, the upshot would be that by taking
the offer in the Reconstruction Acts and approving the Fourteenth
Amendment, the South was agreeing to be bound, not by their own
understandings of its language, but by that of the imposing power, the
North. This is true even if the Reconstruction Acts breached some sorts
of norms of democratic self-government. As applied to the
intergenerational assertions of authority at stake in the dead hand
problem, the result is a form of originalism that can sidestep the

156. See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions
Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 119, 119–20 (2004).
157. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned,
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution . . . .”); see also AID v. All. for Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2013) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that citizens are free to hold political views contrary to that of the
Constitution, such as communism or anarchism, but Article VI wisely imposes “affirmative
ideological commitments prerequisite to assisting in the government’s work”).
158. See, e.g., WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
111 (§ 3.2.16.6) (2002) (1785) (“As oaths are designed for the security of the imposer, it is manifest
that they must be interpreted and performed in the sense in which the imposer intends them;
otherwise, they afford no security to him. And this is the meaning of the rule, ‘jurare in animum
imponentis’. . . .”); id. at 119 (§ 3.2.21) (“The animus imponentis . . . is the measure of the juror’s
[i.e., oath-swearer’s] duty. The inquiry, therefore, concerning subscription will be, quis imposuit,
et quo animo? [Who imposed it, and with what intention?]”).
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normative attacks of the dead hand. Even if the founders breached
norms of self-government in requiring later generations to swear the
Article VI oath, those who swear it are nonetheless bound to obey it as
its text would be understood from the imposer’s perspective, i.e.,
according to its original meaning.
A second source of insight is an analogy to the assertion of in rem
jurisdiction by a court: authority over a thing, rather than authority
over persons (i.e., in personam jurisdiction). Litigants who want to
assert a claim in the thing must agree to abide by the court’s rulings,
independent of any authority the court might otherwise have to issue
judgments binding on those litigants; “all the world” is bound in virtue
of the court’s control over the res.159 The theory of in rem jurisdiction,
however, is that we can decide whether a court has authority over a
particular thing without having to resolve, on the basis of otherwiseapplicable in personam personal-jurisdiction rules, whether the court
would have authority over all of the particular people in the world who
might claim an interest in the object. Authority over the object is
enough. If the founding generation, or the North, or pre-existing states,
are legitimately in control of the federal government, then they can
exercise authority over that government in a way that will legitimately
bind everyone in the world who wants to take part in it—later
generations, the South, or those in territories seeking to become states.
A third source of guidance is an analogy to the shrink-wrap
contract. Under cases like ProCD v. Zeidenberg160 and Hill v. Gateway
2000,161 purchasers who accept a license as part of the price of obtaining
a product are bound by that license’s terms, even if the purchaser never
reads it and there is therefore no “meeting of the minds” of the
contracting parties. The contract written by the seller, and to which the
buyer is given access, governs according to its terms, even though the
159. See, e.g., Mankin v. Chandler, 16 F. Cas. 625, 626 (E.D. Va. 1823) (Marshall, J.)
(“[W]here the process is to be served on the thing itself, and where the mere possession of the
thing itself, by the service of the process and making proclamation, authorizes the court to decide
upon it without notice to any individual whatever, it is a proceeding in rem, to which all the world
are parties.”); Dulin v. McCaw, 20 S.E. 681, 684 (W.Va. 1894) (“A proceeding in rem is a judicial
proceeding against the thing itself, which, terminating in a valid judgment, binds all the world.”).
160. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448–49 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that Shrinkwrap
licenses are enforceable as soon as the buyer tears the wrapping of the package, even if they are
printed on the outside of the box).
161. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that in a
situation where the terms of a product sent in a box to a buyer stated that they governed the sale,
unless the item was returned within 30 days, bound the buyer who failed to return the product,
because contracts do not need to be read to be effective, and those who fail to read the terms
assume the risk of those terms being unfavorable).

GREEN 12.8.17 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/18/2017 2:46 PM

LOYAL DENOMINATORISM AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

203

seller is almost certainly the only one who has considered all of its
language. The founders, the North, and existing states are entitled to
shrink-wrap the federal government with the Article VI oath, binding
anyone who wants access to it.
Fourth, consider an analogy between the past and a foreign country.
“The past is a different country; they do things differently there.”162
“[E]ach new generation born is in effect an invasion of civilization by
little barbarians, who must be civilized before it is too late.”163 Noah
Webster claimed that intergenerational constitutional assertions of
authority were as illegitimate as one nation telling another what to do:
“[T]he very attempt to make perpetual constitutions, is the assumption
of a right to control the opinions of future generations; and to legislate
for those over whom we have as little authority as we have over a
nation in Asia.”164 But if the past is a different country, then future
generations of officials are immigrants, without any particular right to
claim a share of past generations’ resources. If this analogy is right, then
naturalization and Article VI oaths are on a moral par.
This quick sketch makes a great many unstated and challengeable
assumptions, but I hope to make them explicit and defend them in the
future. In short, like Ackerman, Harrison, Amar, and Colby, I use the
Fourteenth Amendment as my own favorable precedent. The
imposition of the Fourteenth Amendment on a South was rightly seen
by many of those favoring the loyal denominator as closely analogous
to the imposition of the Constitution on new states formed out of the
territories, which is itself closely analogous to the imposition of the
Constitution on later generations. If this three-fold analogy is proper,
and if we think the South was obliged to obey a Northern-authored
Fourteenth Amendment, we can generalize the normative lesson. Like
the former Confederates, new states and later generations were not
given the chance to vote on the Constitution as it then stood;
participation in the federal Union and taking offices governed by
Article VI mean submitting to its Constitution on a take-it-or-leave-it

162. L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN 5 (1953).
163. THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL
STRUGGLES 167 (2007). Others attribute the same idea to Hannah Arendt. E.g., Jonah Goldberg,
Western Civilization and Other Fairy Tales, NATIONALREVIEW.COM, https://goo.gl/sDArf7
(“Political theorist Hannah Arendt once said that, every generation, Western civilization is
invaded by barbarians–we call them ‘children.’”).
164. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 379 (2d
ed., 1983) (citing Giles Hickory (pseudonym for Noah Webster), On the Absurdity of a Bill of
Rights, AMERICAN MAGAZINE (Dec. 1787)).
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basis. Having taken the offer, however, the South, new states, and later
generations swearing the Article VI oath are all obliged to obey the
Constitution according to its terms, as those terms were understood by
those in the Union before, imposing it on new entrants—i.e., as it was
understood by the North, by earlier states, and by the founding
generation.
C. The Importance of Context in Interpretation
A third implication of loyal denominatorism is a fuller appreciation
of the role of larger linguistic context in supplying tacit limits to the
scope of terms like “the several States” or “each State” in the
Constitution. Facially, these texts seem to apply even during war, but
context supplies an implicit peacetime limit. Jonathan Gienapp has
recently complained that originalists’ interpretive method is “narrow
and atomistic,” rather than appreciating the way in which “individual
utterances earn their meaning based on how they fit into a linguistic
whole.”165 The importance of context-sensitive tacit quantifier domain
restrictions can serve as a partial antidote to the atomism and contextinsensitivity that Gienapp sees in originalism. Such atomism is not
essential to originalism. Only the context in which a text is embedded
tells us what domain it is intended to cover.166

165. Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 936 (2015) (“By failing to historicize the American Founding, their
method of translation proceeds from the faulty premise that the Founding generation and we
today occupy more or less the same linguistic world, an assumption that enables their translation
to take a narrow and atomistic form. Accordingly, as a result of this failure to historicize, they fail
to appreciate the holistic character of meaning—that individual utterances earn their meaning
based on how they fit into a linguistic whole—and, accordingly, target the wrong object of
interpretation, focusing on individual words and statements when they must first grasp the
broader idioms from which those component parts issued.”).
166. Gottlob Frege’s philosophy of language similarly stresses the need for larger linguistic
context: “[I]t is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning.” GOTTLOB
FREGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC 73 (§ 62) (Oxford, Blackwell ed. 1950) (1884) (the
Grundlagen) (“Nur im Zusammenhang eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas.”); see also id. at
71–72 (§ 60) (“[W]e ought always to keep before our eyes a complete proposition. Only in a
proposition have the words really a meaning.”); id. at 116 (§ 106) (“[W]e must never try to define
the meaning of a word in isolation, but only as it is used in the context of a proposition.”). For
Frege’s sense-reference distinction, see generally Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the
Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555 (2006); Frege’s context principle is also
worth attention from legal scholars.
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D. Implications of Northern Authorship for the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Meaning
Loyal denominatorism changes the constitutional author from the
traditional entire 37-state nation to the rump 26 states taking part in the
federal government in February 1867. Therefore, the text of the
Amendment should be read through the lens of Northern views of
equality, due process, and the privileges of citizens, not as if the
Amendment was genuinely co-authored with the South. An English
sentence today would be interpreted slightly differently if we thought
it were written by someone in England or Australia rather than
America, or by a committee with members spread out among different
English-speaking countries. Analogously, we should focus on the
resonance of the Fourteenth Amendment text with Northern legal
ideas, not those that could span both North and South. To the extent
they differ from their Southern counterparts, Northern notions of
equality, civil liberty, and due process are the Fourteenth Amendment’s
interpretive key. 167
There are some reasons to think that the North and South spoke
different legal languages during Reconstruction.
First, the background principles and practices that informed the
Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of equality168 were very
different in the North and the South. Brown v. Board of Education, for
instance, shied away from historical grounds in part because of the
history of segregated education—and lack of education—in the
167. For a few Republicans who described the Fourteenth Amendment as the export of
Northern civil liberties to the South, see, e.g., SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866: IN THE
STATES OF OHIO, KENTUCKY AND INDIANA 20 (1866) (speech of Benjamin Butler, August 25)
(stating that the Fourteenth Amendment demands “that any one shall walk in peace in South
Carolina the same as a citizen of South Carolina can now walk in Massachusetts”); id. at 41
(speech of Franz Sigel, September 27) (“There will be no peace, no prosperity, till every man,
white or black—as I see here a black face before me—shall be as safe in this whole country, not
only in the North, but in the South.”); American Gazette, September 28, 1866, quoted in EDWARD
MCPHERSON, PROPOSED FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 23 (1868)
(“[W]hat this amendment does secure is the right of northern men, white or black, to enjoy, in
any southern State to which business or pleasure may take them, the same immunity from outrage
that is afforded her in the free north.”).
168. See generally Green, supra note 45 (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
requires equal citizenship). The Supreme Court has housed this equality requirement in the Equal
Protection Clause, but there is good reason to house it instead in the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, because “protection of the laws” was a well-understood term referring to literal protection
from violence and the right to a remedy. See generally Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense
of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1
(2008); Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent
History and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 219 (2009).
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South.169 The history of segregation and education in the North, while
far from exemplary, was very different,170 and this difference matters if
the Fourteenth Amendment expressed Northern principles, rather than
principles of the full nation.
Second, to the extent that rights prevalent in the Union at the
precise time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted have special
claim to count as “privileges . . . of citizens of the United States,”171 it
matters if the North alone was fully represented in the Union at the
time. The continuously-loyal states and those of the former
Confederacy had different traditions of civil liberty. Steven Calabresi
and Sarah Agudo point out some regional differences in the privileges
generally accorded to citizens in different regions of the country in
1868.172 One particularly striking instance is the right to keep and bear
arms. In incorporating the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth,
McDonald v. Chicago relies on the fact that “a clear majority of the
States in 1868”—22 of 37—recognized such rights in their
constitutions.173 However, “protection of gun rights was particularly

169. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489, 489 n.4 (1954) (explaining
some regional differences in education between the North and South, noting much slower
development in South).
170. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA.
L. REV. 947, 962 (1995) (“[T]he first attacks on racially segregated education occurred at the state
level, in both the South and the North. Developments in the two regions, however, were so
different that they must be considered separately.”); id. at 977 (“The experience in the Northern
states during the fifteen-year period after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment thus falls
short of proving that school segregation was understood to violate the Amendment, but it is also
inconsistent with the equally extreme view that the Amendment had no bearing on the issue . . . .
As the implications of the new constitutional regime came to be more fully understood in the
North, segregation eventually was prohibited, either by legislative or judicial action, in every
state.”).
171. See Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Opening Pandora’s Box? Privileges or Immunities,
the Constitution in 2020, and Properly Incorporating the Second Amendment, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 8 (2010) (placing focus on “how privileges or immunities were understood in 1868”); id.
at 70 (accepting my earlier characterization that such a view would “freeze the privileges of
citizens of the United States in 1868 amber”); see also Christopher R. Green, McDonald v.
Chicago, the Meaning-Application Distinction, and “Of” in the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
11 ENGAGE NO. 1, 24, 26 (Mar. 2010) (explaining different interpretations of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
172. See Steven Calabresi & Sarah Agudo, Individual Rights under State Constitutions when
the Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply Rooted in the American
History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 29–30 (2008) (showing charts displaying regional
trends for various constitutional rights, defining “South” as the former slave states minus
Delaware). Of course, to produce data most relevant to my view of the Fourteenth Amendment
author, the 1868 should be 1867, and “South” should be defined more narrowly (i.e., excluding
Tennessee, Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland).
173. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 777 (2010) (relying on Calabresi & Agudo, supra
note 172, at 50).
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Southern as long ago as 1868.”174 Because 13 of the 15 states lacking
state-constitutional rights to keep and bear arms were in the North
(including Nebraska), the 22-to-15 majority slims down to 14-12 if only
those states represented in Congress at the exact moment of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption in February 1867 are considered
(the majority shrinks further, to 14-13, if Nebraska, admitted on March
1, 1867, is included too).175 There was therefore no national stateconstitutional consensus in favor of gun rights at the Fourteenth
Amendment’s precise time of adoption. To be sure, I disagree with
McDonald about whether the prevalence of rights at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s creation is the critical consideration for what
substantive rights are protected by the Amendment; I would take the
44-of-50 ratio today, which Justice Scalia mentioned at the McDonald
oral argument but which went unmentioned in the opinion, as much
more important.176 But if we are to focus on the rights prevalent when
the Amendment was adopted, we should focus on the states actually
adopting it.
Finally, Ryan Williams’s survey of the antebellum rise of substantive
due process (a term he applies to vested-rights and general-law
versions of due process, not merely the sort that flowered in Munn v.
Illinois and Lochner v. New York) reveals significantly stronger support
for the doctrine in the South, especially in the Carolinas.177

174. Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 172, at 51.
175. Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 191 (2006) (listing 12 represented Northern states with no such rights in 1867, as well as
Nebraska: California (no provision, id. at 194), Delaware (adopted in 1987, id. at 194), Iowa (no
provision, id. at 196), Illinois (adopted in 1970, id. at 196), Maryland (no provision, id. at 197),
Minnesota (no provision, id. at 198), Nebraska (adopted in 1988, id. at 199); New Hampshire
(adopted in 1982, id. at 199), New Jersey (no provision, id. at 200), Nevada (adopted in 1982, id.
at 199), New York (no provision, id. at 200), Wisconsin (adopted in 1998, id. at 204), and West
Virginia (adopted in 1986, id. at 204). The other two states lacking state-constitutional rights to
keep and bear arms in 1868, but having them today, were in the South: Louisiana (adopted in
1879, id. at 197) and Virginia (adopted in 1971, id. at 204)).
176. See Green, supra note 3, at 113–17.
177. Ryan Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408,
462–63 (2010) (noting that of the first 14 states to embrace vested-rights and law-of-generalapplicability readings of due-process or law-of-the-land provisions, 8 were among the 11 states of
the Confederacy, including Tennessee); id. at 469 (counting 6 more loyal states by 1868).
Williams’s ratio therefore declines somewhat, from 20 out of 37 to 13 out of 26. Williams’s work
shows that the vested-rights and law-of-general-applicability traditions were much shallower in
the North.
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CONCLUSION
Seen as the product of a Northern author, the Fourteenth
Amendment will be interpreted differently than it would if read as a
North-South compromise: the concepts of due process, the privileges of
citizenship, and equality were part of both Northern and Southern legal
cultures, but the overlap between the two regions’ versions of these
ideas was not perfect. A Northern-authored Fourteenth Amendment
may be in tension with the idea of the United States as a permanentlyunited nation making decisions democratically as one people. The Civil
War, however, disrupted our nation’s democratic unity in a way that
allowed those who stayed with the Union’s political apparatus to
impose conditions on those who voluntary left it and later re-entered.
Tacit restrictions on the scope of language are commonplace both in
linguistic theory and the law of armed conflict, rendering the
Republican loyal-denominator view not only intelligible but
compelling. We can preserve traditional notions of uncoerced
constitutional deliberation only by excluding coerced, congressionally
unrepresented States from the constitutional author. This Southern
forfeiture of their rights of seniority is the sort of problem that emerges
elsewhere in democratic theory. The Northern power to preserve the
Union by imposing conditions of loyalty more stringent than the South
desired is closely akin both to the power of the current members of the
Union to impose conditions on the ways in which future members may
enter out of the territories, as well as to the power that a founding
generation has to set rules that will inevitably affect any later
generations participating in the government created by the founders.
Understanding the Fourteenth Amendment’s legitimacy can help us
understand constitutional legitimacy more generally.

